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Introduction 
 As of 2014, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) estimates 
that the number of refugees has exceeded 50 million people in the post-World War II era.1 These 
are people who are fleeing from internal conflicts, abusive, corrupt governments, economic 
hardships, and social discrimination. The current global refugee crisis affects countless third 
parties, including state leaders, host government structures, economic stability, and individuals 
other than the refugees themselves. The crisis has the potential to influence the way the 
international community will approach future immigration issues, economic policy, and political 
relationships. Countries that host these refugees must make key decisions regarding how refugee 
influxes will impact their economic, political, and civil stability. Jordan, situated in a conflict-
ridden region, has manifested itself as a refugee state, for it has dealt with refugee influxes since 
the United Nations (UN) established Israel as a state in 1948. Since 1948, Jordan has confronted 
several refugee influxes, including those fleeing from Palestine, Iraq, and Syria.  
 The current Syrian refugee crisis in Jordan deems this topic necessary for discussion and 
thorough evaluation because it threatens Jordan’s economic and political stability. Amnesty 
International reported in February 2016 that Jordan hosts over 635,000 Syrian refugees in 
addition to those already in the country. Jordan finds it difficult to provide education to Syrian 
children as well as its own population, so the Jordanian Ministry of Education has begun a 
double-shift school system. This new school system “groups Jordanian and Syrian refugee 
students separately, where the Jordanians attend school in the morning shift, and the Syrians go 
                                                 
1 UNHCR, “10 Facts about Current Refugee Crises Worldwide,” August 7, 2014, UNHCR: The 
UN Refugee Agency, accessed April 13, 2016, http://www.unhcr.ie/news/irish-story/10-facts-about-
current-refugee-crises-worldwide. 
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to school in the afternoon shift.”2 The Jordanian monarchy allowed the British Council, an 
international organization that promotes educational opportunities, to train Jordanian teachers to 
make their lessons more effective to cope with and to place the educational needs of Syrian 
children at the forefront of response policy.3 This education shortage is an example of the types 
of issues that confront the Jordan government. Other limiting factors that Jordan faces include, 
water shortages, residential shortages, health care access, political unrest, et cetera.  
In December of 2015, there were over one million people who were either refugees or 
asylum-seekers in Jordan, which had a population of 8,117,564 at the time. Jordan’s long history 
of confronting mass refugee influxes has conditioned its government to respond in various ways. 
Economic, political, and humanitarian responsibility each had a part in influencing the Jordanian 
government’s response to the refugee influxes. For instance, King Abdullah I (1946-1951), the 
first king of independent Jordan, extended citizenship rights to Palestinians fleeing from Israeli 
occupation in 1948.4 Furthermore, Abdullah I’s grandson, King Hussein (1952-1999), recalled 
the pan-Arab movement and felt a humanitarian responsibility to Arabs. King Hussein’s son, 
King Abdullah II (1999-present) continued this generational tolerance and acceptance of 
refugees. Since assuming the throne in 1999, his government has had to navigate through 
multiple mass refugee influxes—Iraqis in the 1990s and 2000s and Syrians beginning in 2011. 
Jordan is, in a sense, a refugee state.  
This paper demonstrates that, though Jordan’s government responses have not always 
been accepting and tolerant, the government has consistently reverted back to positive policy 
                                                 
2 Rua’a Alameri, “Syrian refugees in ‘double-shift’ Jordan schools face obstacles,” Al Arabiya 
English, April 3, 2016, accessed April 15, 2016, 
http://english.alarabiya.net/en/perspective/features/2016/04/03/Syrian-refugees-in-double-shift-Jordan-
schools-face-obstacles-.html. 
3 Ibid.  
4 Abdullah I was Emir of Transjordan from 1921-1946 before Jordan gained its independence. 
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responses. These positive policy responses are determined through the examination of Karen 
Jacobsen’s host government response model, which she outlines in her paper, “Factors 
Influencing the Policy Responses of Host Governments to Mass Refugee Influxes.”5 Her criteria 
for determining the policy type that a host government decides to pursue are outlined in the 
following sections. This paper will compare Jordan’s multiple refugee influxes to Jacobsen’s 
government response model. Determining Jordan’s government response will be useful in 
predicting future Jordanian response as it continues to confront the Syrian refugee crisis. In 
addition, this study highlights possible policies that governments other than Jordan may choose 
to pursue if they are faced with mass refugee influxes. It is a tool which policymakers and 
governments alike can utilize to gain a more comprehensive perspective on the implications and 
constraints that surround government absorption of refugees.  
What Is a Refugee? 
 Before delving into Jacobsen’s model on host government responses as it applies to the 
Jordanian case, it is important to outline and clearly define who qualifies as a “refugee” under 
international law. In 1948, the UN General Assembly drafted and implemented resolution 217A, 
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. This document lays out fundamental human rights 
that the international community will “universally [protect].”6 Article 14 of the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights is thus:  
1. Everyone has the right to seek and to enjoy in other countries asylum from 
persecution. 
                                                 
5 This article was published in International Migration Review. Karen Jacobsen is a research 
professor at The Fletcher School of international studies at Tufts University. Her research interests are 
refugee and migration issues, humanitarian assistance, and developing countries.  
6 United Nations General Assembly, “Universal Declaration of Human Rights,” United Nations, 
December 10, 1948, accessed April 15, 2016, 
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/UDHR/Documents/UDHR_Translations/eng.pdf. 
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2. This right may not be invoked in the case of prosecutions genuinely arising 
from non-political crimes or from acts contrary to the purposes and principles of 
the United Nations.7 
 
Article 14 is the first formalized, legal basis for refugees as autonomous entities in and of 
themselves. Since they have a right to seek and to enjoy this asylum, asylum comes with 
certain assumptions as to what a safe haven entails. Article 14 is vague as to the rights 
that host countries should afford refugees upon allowing them to cross their borders. 
Therefore, the UN drafted the 1951 Refugee Convention, which clearly defined a refugee 
as someone “unable or unwilling to return to their country of origin owing to a well 
founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of 
a particular social group, or political opinion.”8 Having this refugee status grants refugees 
certain rights, which the Convention’s signatories must abide by. These rights include but 
are not limited to the right to employment, housing, education, and an equal share of 
resources in short supply. The 1951 Convention “cover[ed] only those persons who have 
become refugees as a result of events occurring before 1 January 1951,” meaning that 
people displaced in various events after 1951 are not covered under this Convention. 
However, the United Nations added the 1967 Protocol so that all refugees are guaranteed 
the same rights under the Convention regardless of the timeline. The 1951 Convention 
and the 1967 Protocol are at the center of international law concerning refugees.  
Jordan on Refugees 
 Since this study focuses on Jordan’s government policies in particular, it is key to 
point out that Jordan is not a signatory to either the 1951 Convention or to the 1967 
Protocol. The fact that Jordan is not a member of these pivotal pieces of international law 
                                                 
7 Ibid. 
8 United Nations, “Convention and Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees,” United Nations, 
accessed April 15, 2016, http://www.unhcr.org/3b66c2aa10.html. 
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is especially jarring since it has such a long history of refugee relations. However, Jordan 
has specific refugee policy written into its domestic legal system, which leaves it flexible 
to change. For instance, article 21 of the Jordanian Constitution states:  
(i) Political refugees shall not be extradited on account of their political beliefs or 
for their defence of liberty. 
(ii) Extradition of ordinary criminals shall be regulated by international 
agreements and laws.9  
 
This flexibility could allow Jordan to change its refugee regulations rather quickly to adapt to 
modern refugee influxes.  
Though Jordan is not a signatory to the 1951 Convention and its protocol, it has incorporated 
refugee relations and stipulations into its legal framework. Jordan has a system in place that is 
meant to address issues that may arise with a mass refugee influx. Broadly, Jordan has 
implemented both restrictive and receptive policies concerning refugees. For instance, Jordan 
makes gaining a residency permit relatively difficult, for it granted only about 30 percent of Iraqi 
refugees residency permits.10 This obstacle, in turn, makes it even more difficult for refugees to 
gain work permits that would help them assimilate into Jordanian society. King Abdullah II, the 
current Jordanian monarch, however, has expressed his willingness to accept and accommodate 
the most recent refugees—those fleeing the Syrian Civil War. The king made a few statements to 
that effect, including that “the kingdom’s public services has been under strain after Jordan spent 
25 percent of the state budget on helping refugees.”11 This expenditure on refugees demonstrates 
                                                 
9 Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, “The Constitution of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan: Rights 
and Duties of Jordanians,” accessed April 16, 2016, http://www.kinghussein.gov.jo/constitution_jo.html.  
10 James Emanuel, “Discriminatory Nationality Laws in Jordan and Their Effect on Mixed 
Refugee Families,” University of Notre Dame: The Law School, Spring 2012, accessed April 16, 2016, 
http://www3.nd.edu/~ndlaw/prog-human-rights/student-research-papers/NationalityLawsInJordan.pdf. 
11 Vishakha Sonawane, “Jordan’s King Abdullah II Says Citizens At ‘Boiling Point’ Over Syrian 
Refugees Influx: Report,” February 2, 2016, International Business Times, accessed April 16, 2016, 
http://www.ibtimes.com/jordans-king-abdullah-ii-says-citizens-boiling-point-over-syrian-refugees-influx-
2289688. 
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Jordan’s continued commitment to easing the costs associated with resource shortages.12 This 
study will determine whether Jordan has and continues to implement positive or negative refugee 
policies according to Karen Jacobsen’s model on government responses to refugee influxes.   
Theory 
Relevant Models 
 The topic of government crisis management has been a point of discussion for scholars 
and politicians for decades, as they seek to understand which are the preferred methods to handle 
dire situations. Academics and policymakers have devised several general models for state crisis 
management, isolating patterns and trends. Uriel Rosenthal, a Dutch politician and former 
Minister of Foreign Affairs, and Alexander Kouzmin, a professor at the University of Western 
Sydney, state that there are five heuristic steps of government decision-making. Their study 
covers various types of crises, including natural disasters, nuclear emergencies, terrorist attacks, 
and violent demonstrations. These steps include evaluating if a threat exists to the socio-political 
system in the host country; determining a necessity to respond to the threat; specifying the need 
of government intervention based on capacity and responsibility of the political and bureaucratic 
authorities; determining a temporal response; transitioning from external observations of the 
threat to action. This model does not suggest, as Rosenthal and Kouzmin explicitly point out, that 
governments are a benevolent influence. The government’s credibility and legitimacy are at risk 
because “governments may make decisions to unduly aggravate the crisis… [and] governmental 
authorities may lack physical courage” to manage the crisis.13 With these general steps, 
                                                 
12 The Syrian refugee crisis will be detailed in subsequent sections. 
13 Uriel Rosenthal and Alexander Kouzmin, “Crises and Crisis Management: Toward 
Comprehensive Government Decision Making,” Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory 
7, no. 2 (April 1997): 287. 
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Rosenthal and Kouzmin have outlined loose trends that occur at the state level of crisis 
management. 
 Rosenthal and Kouzmin’s model represents one of the simpler and more applicable ways 
that governments deal with crises. Michael Brecher, a professor focused on the study of the 
theory of international crises at McGill University, presents a stress-coping-choice model of state 
behavior in international crises. He applies his model to various international crises, including 
the Korean War and the Cuban Missile Crisis. Brecher’s independent variable is “stress induced 
by perceptions of value threat, time pressure, and the probability of war.”14 His dependent 
variable is the government’s choice. An environmental change (the crisis) creates stress, which 
then leads to coping while the government attempts to isolate a way to handle the crisis. Coping 
is Brecher’s intervening variable where the government engages in information analysis, 
consultation, decisional forums, and discussions of alternatives. After the government has gone 
through the coping phase, it must make a choice. 
 Brecher defines a threat as being “the anticipation of harm of some kind, an anticipation 
that is created by the presence of certain stimulus cues signifying to the individual [or group] that 
there is to be an experience of harm.”15 His model is more centered in a militaristic context, like 
the Cuban Missile Crisis and the Korean War, but it remains useful as an analysis of 
international crises. Brecher split the time portion of his model into three periods: precrisis, 
crisis, and postcrisis. An “increase in perceived threat on the part of decision makers” marks the 
precrisis period, beginning the threat evaluation process among state authorities. All three 
characteristics of a crisis are present in the crisis period—a rise in perceived threat, the need to 
act in a timely fashion, and a high probability of military involvement. The post crisis period 
                                                 
14 Brecher, 446. 
15 Ibid., 453.  
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“begins with an observable decline in intensity of one or more of the three perceptual 
conditions,”16 and it leads to the end of the crisis. The crisis ends in this stage because “a 
decision or cluster of choices in the postcrisis period will lead to a situational change”17 that no 
longer stresses the three conditions of a crisis. This model, largely based on military 
involvement, is useful to analyze because it adds an international framework through which to 
study crisis management. It allows government officials to map out other states’ tentative actions 
and their processes for carrying out those actions.   
The Jacobsen Model 
 The Rosenthal and the Brecher models provide general frameworks for government 
decision-making. However, there are very few studies that have discussed refugee crises from 
the host government’s perspective. Karen Jacobsen, a migration research professor at Tufts 
University, conducted a study to isolate the most prominent factors that influence policy 
responses of governments hosting refugee influxes. Jacobsen tends to focus on refugee situations 
in developing countries. In the International Migration Review, Jacobsen published “Factors 
Influencing the Policy Responses of Host Government to Mass Refugee Influxes,” 
 which seeks to understand “policy responses of asylum governments to mass influxes of 
refugees.”18 She particularly wanted to isolate the reasons why less developed host governments 
respond generously or restrictively.  
 First, it is necessary to define key terms in Jacobsen’s research. A refugee influx “refers 
to people who flee their country en masse…within a relatively short period (a few years)…large 
numbers (thousands)…[as a result of] civil war and insurgency, ethnic or religious persecution, 
                                                 
16 Ibid., 457. 
17 Ibid., 460. 
18 Karen Jacobsen, “Factors Influencing the Policy Responses of Host Governments to Mass 
Refugee Influxes,” The International Migration Review 30, no. 3 (Autumn 1996): 655. 
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environmental disaster, and famine.”19 A government response “refers to actions (or inactions) 
taken by the government and other state institutions that include specific refugee policies, 
military responses, unofficial actions, and policy implementation.”20  
According to Jacobsen’s model, there are three sources of pressure on host government 
refugee decision-making. The first source of pressure is from “institutions and individuals in the 
international community which are concerned with the welfare of refugees.”21 The primary 
institution is the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), which can, along 
with individuals and other institutions, apply pressure by publicizing negative aspects of a 
government’s current policies toward refugees and straining diplomatic positions concerning the 
refugee crisis. The second, and most affected, source of pressure is the local community 
receiving the refugee influx. The local community’s response to a refugee influx determines “the 
extent to which the community is willing and able to absorb”22 the refugees. This is a 
community’s absorption capacity, and it consists of structural ability and willingness of the 
community. Economic capacity (land availability, employment systems, infrastructure, etc.) and 
international assistance determine structural ability. Cultural attitudes towards refugees, 
perceived length of residence, and historical experiences with refugees determine the willingness 
aspect of a community’s absorption capacity.23 The third source of pressure on host governments 
is from the refugees themselves. They can threaten to overwhelm the host government through 
sheer numbers and will power concerning treatment and accommodation from the host country. 
Often, refugees can refer to the UNHCR, lawyers, non-profits, and other international entities 
                                                 
19 Ibid., 657.  
20 Ibid. 
21 Ibid.  
22 Ibid., 666.  
23 Ibid.  
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devoted to refugee welfare.24 These three forms of pressure that can influence a host government 
lead it to react to the refugee crisis in three ways. 
Jacobsen chooses to outline the choices of host governments in a simple manner; she 
states that they only have three types of choices to make regarding a refugee influx. They can do 
nothing, react negatively, or react positively. She acknowledges that government decisions are 
not black and white and are, therefore, a mixture of all three choice types. By doing nothing the 
government “suggests that it either lacks the capacity for action, is unwilling to act, or does not 
consider the appearance of refugees as a significant matter for its agenda.”25 The positive and 
negative reactions are more complex than the choice type of doing nothing. This is where policy 
decisions can neither be purely positive nor purely negative. However, Jacobsen identifies the 
most common and most likely policies that would fall under each category. Those responses are 
then broken down into three policy types: legal-bureaucratic, international refugee organizations 
(IROs), and the admission and treatment of refugees.26 Broadly, positive responses include 
defining asylum seekers as refugees, designating a department in the state to deal with refugees, 
cooperate with IROs, or considering refugees for local settlement or permanent residency.27 
Negative responses include placing restrictions on movements and employment of refugees, 
forcing refugees to live in camps, and having no proper procedures for the determination of 
refugee status.  
Justification for the Jacobsen Model 
 In this study, the Jacobsen model will provide the clearest and most concise analysis of 
Jordan’s numerous refugee crises since the first wave of Palestinians in 1948 and in 1967. Using 
                                                 
24 Ibid., 657.  
25 Ibid., 658.  
26 See Appendix A for a table detailing Jacobsen’s possible state responses to refugee influxes.  
27 Jacobsen, 659. 
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her model, this study will analyze the Jordanian monarchy’s reactions to refugee crises. Since 
most host governments conduct refugee crisis management with a mixture of positive and 
negative responses, this model will aid in determining which type of response Jordan generally 
adopts. There is an underlying causal chain in this method of analysis, for the refugee crisis leads 
to a government response; Jordan has never taken the “do nothing” policy choice. That 
government response is the dependent variable in this study. The government response will be 
considered over various time periods, with different refugee influxes, then the response will be 
examined as a whole to draw conclusions about Jordan’s general response patterns. The primary 
independent variables will be the factors that most affect Jordan’s response to refugee influxes. 
Following the identification of the factors that influence the government’s decisions, whether 
humanitarian, political, or practical, there will be an evaluation of the effects of the decisions.  
 
Three sources of pressure→ government reaction 
 
Jacobsen’s model has outlined this causal chain, and it will be applied to the Jordanian case with 
particular attention placed on the Palestinian, Iraqi, and Syrian refugees. The evolution of 
Jordan’s decision making will be extrapolated from these cases as examples of Jordan’s long 
term refugee history. Jacobsen’s model is useful because it is simple, and it provides a 
framework that is focused on refugee influxes in less developed countries. Her model devises a 
set of clear, general questions that one can ask while examining a specific refugee crisis. These 
questions require mostly “yes” or “no” answers—with a few exceptions added for clarity. 
Through quantifying number of “yes” answers in the positive policy categories, one can make a 
weighted judgment as to which policy type a host government has implemented—non-reactive, 
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positive, or negative. In addition, Jacobsen specifically addresses some of Jordan’s problems 
with handling the refugee influxes, such as its slack of structural ability. It does not however, 
describe Jordan explicitly, which allows for this study to trace the evolution or refugee policies 
over Jordan’s long history of migrant crises due to its generality. Whether the Jordanian 
government responds positively or negatively to the current refugee crisis will help determine the 
type of intention behind Jordan’s strategies (political, economic, or humanitarian).  
This paper will adapt her model to have a more thorough discussion of the effects of 
refugee influxes on the Jordanian government. In some situations, a host government may have 
to learn from its failures and modify its responses accordingly. For example, Jordan’s first wave 
of Palestinian refugees in 1948 prepared it for the 1967 wave of Palestinians because it allowed 
the government to prepare and predict the types of problems that arise from refugee influxes, 
such as food and housing shortages. Jacobsen’s model will illuminate how the Jordanian 
government has responded to mass refugee influxes throughout its history. The intentions and 
influences behind Jordan’s refugee policy will be based on the positive or negative responses and 
which ones Jordan picks most often.  
The Applied Jacobsen Model 
The First Palestinian Wave (1948) 
 May 15, 1948 is known as Nakba Day to millions of Palestinians. Nakba Day marks the 
point in the 1948 Arab-Israeli conflict where 726,000 Palestinians either fled or a new Israeli 
state expelled them from their territories.2829 The Second Session of the United Nations General 
Assembly mandated the “partition of Palestine into Jewish and Arab states,” causing the exodus 
                                                 
28 Benny Morris, The Birth of the Palestinian Refugee Problem Revisited (New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 2004), 602.  
29 This is the United Nations estimate. The numbers have been inflated by host governments and 
the Israeli government.  
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of hundreds of thousands of Palestinians to surrounding areas—Lebanon, Syria, and Jordan.30 
University of Akron professor, Ghazi Falah, believes that the events that led to Nakba Day 
“served as catalytic agents for the transformation of Palestine’s cultural landscape”31 through 
violence and forced displacement. This is one of the many perspectives that surround the Arab-
Israeli conflict. Some scholars and politicians frame the exodus of the Palestinians as if they fled 
at the requests of other Arab countries—like Jordan.32 While the origins of this exodus are 
significant and relevant, it remains that Jordan bore massive numbers of Palestinian refugees. As 
of July 1, 2014, there were 2,097,338 Palestinian refugees in Jordan (total population 6,607,000) 
registered with the United Nations (UN).33 Many of the Palestinians in Jordan are descendants of 
those from the 1948 and the 1967 refugee influxes, making them second and third generation 
Palestinians.  
 A brief background on the events that led to the first wave of Palestinians that entered 
Jordan in the years following 1948 is necessary to put the refugee crisis into perspective. After 
the UN passed the resolution in 1947 that would allow for the creation of a Jewish state, “Zionist 
leaders feared such numbers of non-Jews would threaten the stability of the new state both 
militarily—and socially—insofar as a substantial Muslim and Christian minority would 
challenge the new state’s Jewish character.”34 The creation of Israel is the ultimate root of the 
hostilities between the Arabs and the Jews. It is the foundation of the Palestinian refugee crisis 
                                                 
30 UNRWA, “The Flight: 1948,” UNRWA, January 17, 2010, accessed March 1, 2016, 
http://www.unrwa.org/galleries/photos/flight-1948. 
31 Ghazi Falah, “The 1948 Israeli-Palestinian War and Its Aftermath: The Transformation and De-
Signification of Palestine's Cultural Landscape,” Annals of the Association of American Geographers 86 
no. 2 (June 1996): 281.  
32 Ibid., 258.  
33 UNRWA, “Where We Work: Jordan,” July 1, 2014, accessed March 1, 2016, 
http://www.unrwa.org/where-we-work/jordan. 
34 Simha Flapan, “The Palestinian Exodus of 1948,” Journal of Palestine Studies 16, no. 4 
(Summer 1987): 3.  
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that Jordan experienced after 1948. Huge numbers of Palestinians began to leave their homes to 
seek refuge elsewhere. There are not reliable and concrete estimates of how many of the refugees 
from the 1948 wave came to Jordan; however, it is clear that many descendants of this first wave 
remain refugees in Jordan. Millions of Palestinian refugees are registered as such with United 
Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA). Since its 
founding in 1946, Jordan has been heavily involved in refugee relations, acquiring important 
experience and knowledge in the field.  
 The events of and following 1948 fit Jacobsen’s criteria, qualifying the mass migration as 
a refugee influx because thousands of Palestinians came into Jordan in a relatively short period of 
time. Jordan garnered a government response, according to Jacobsen, because it enacted and 
implemented specific refugee policies.  
 King Abdullah I of Jordan, the first king of independent Jordan and the former leader of 
Transjordan, had vested interests in acquiring additional territories for his state. These territories 
included parts of modern day Syria, Iraq, and Palestine. Abdullah I became interested in 
acquiring Palestinian territories “when Britain suggested that Palestine might be partitioned 
between Arabs and Jews and that Abdullah might rule the Arab part.”35 Political incentives of 
governing a united Arab community under Hashemite authority drove Abdullah to annex the 
West Bank in 1949.36 After Jordan’s annexation of the West Bank,37 Abdullah I decided to grant 
citizenship to the Palestinians to those in the West Bank and those in the East Bank. The 
monarchy devised land records to “help determine what Palestinians [were] eligible for 
                                                 
35 Mary C. Wilson, “King Abdullah and Palestine,” Bulletin (British Society for Middle Eastern 
Studies) 14 no. 1 (1987), 38.  
36 Ibid., 41. 
37 Jordan would occupy the West Bank from 1949 until June 1967 and retain administrative 
claims until 1988. 
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residence…by providing who is a ‘legitimate’ West Banker of descendant or such a person.”38 
When compared to Jacobsen’s model, the Jordanian land policies fit into the “positive” decision 
type. First, Jordan’s guarantee of citizenship to the Palestinians demonstrated that Jordan wished 
to assimilate the refugees into Jordanian culture and politics. However, there is some controversy 
surrounding these land policies, for some believe that the Jordanian government granted 
citizenship as an attempt to destroy Palestinian identity.39 Although this citizenship policy falls 
under Jacobsen’s “positive” policy type, it also carries significant implications that reflect 
Abdullah’s expansionist mindset.  
 By October 1950, the Palestinian refugee influx increased the population in Amman, 
Jordan’s capital, from “50,000 in early 1948 to 120,000.”40 The UN Disaster Relief Fund had 
taken the responsibility of looking after the Palestinian refugees in Jordan, but UNRWA formed 
in May of 1950, thus taking responsibility of the Palestinians.41 The fact that Jordan allowed 
international refugee organizations to operate within its borders further demonstrates its positive 
policy response. Jacobsen, in her general model for refugee crisis management, specifically 
mentions, “Islam in particular has strong positive traditions concerning the offering of temporary 
refuge or asylum from political persecution.”42 In addition, Arab tribal traditions’ foundations are 
in hospitality and providing help to others.43 These two characteristics common in many Arab 
states serve as a part of the explanation as to why Jordan chooses positive refugee responses.  
                                                 
38 Michael R. Fischbach, “The Implications of Jordanian Land Policy for the West Bank,” Middle 
East Journal 48, no. 3 (Summer 1994), 508.  
39 Ibid. 
40 Beverly Milton-Edwards and Peter Hinchcliffe, Jordan a Hashemite Legacy (New York, NY: 
Routledge 2001), 35.  
41 Ibid., 35. 
42 Jacobsen, 668. 
43 Ibid.  
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 Since UNRWA is an international organization, it inherently is accountable to the 
international community, which is Jacobsen’s first source of pressure put on host governments. 
To reiterate, the first source of pressure on host governments consists of institutions and 
individuals in the international community that advocate for the welfare of refugees. Today, 
UNRWA provides crucial services for the Palestinian refugees, such as education, vocational 
training, housing, healthcare, and foodstuffs. This relief aid has “proved essential to restart a new 
life, often from scratch”44 for the Palestinian people living in Jordan after 1948. For instance, 
UNRWA has been the main healthcare provider for the Palestinian refugees in Jordan since 
1950. These basic services that UNRWA provides to the Palestinian refugees in Jordan are the 
results of international pressure on the Jordanian government to cooperate with such 
organizations.  
 In a sense, Jordan had no choice but to cooperate with IROs due to its lack of resources, 
which could strain its political stability. This stream of events reflects Jacobsen’s second source 
of pressure—that from the local community. The Jordanian community recognized its limited 
structural ability, taking into account the nature of its limited physical and economic capacity. 
For example, Jordan’s physical landscape is arid, making only two percent suitable for 
agriculture. This limited agricultural capacity means that Jordan has to rely heavily on food 
imports, which denotes higher food prices. This type of structural incapacity, as Jacobsen states, 
could affect the willingness of the local community to host a mass refugee influx.45 There may 
have been pressure from the local community after the 1948 influx for the Jordanian government 
to negotiate with and accept the assistance from organizations from UNRWA, thus pressuring for 
                                                 
44 Jalal Al Husseini, “UNRWA and the Refugees: A Difficult but Lasting Marriage,” Journal of 
Palestine Studies 40, no. 1 (Autumn 2010), 14. 
45 Jacobsen, 666. 
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a positive policy response toward international refugee organizations.46 Arguably, the first and 
second sources of pressure are the most influential over a government’s refugee policy. With the 
first source, a host government faces the scrutiny and potential ostracism from the international 
community. The local community is the most affected source of pressure because the refugee 
crisis directly affects its access to key resources like food, water, and shelter.  
Jacobsen’s model discusses refugee repatriation in her analysis of state responses to 
refugee crises. A positive response would be the host country actively pursuing and streamlining 
the repatriation process. However, a negative response concerning repatriation would be for the 
host country to force refugees to return to their home countries or to make it extremely difficult 
to stay in its own country by placing barriers to complicate finding residency or employment.47 
Jordan, in response to the 1948 wave of Palestinians, did not make its decisions based on black 
and white circumstances. The government ultimately carried out a blend of the above referenced 
policies concerning repatriation. Since King Abdullah I annexed the West Bank in 1950, Jordan 
had control over those 700,000 Palestinians who fled from the newly partitioned Israel. The 
Palestinians in Jordan had “no strong affinity to the Hashemites,”48 and this dissonance 
contributed to the varying policy approaches. While the king wished to gain administration over 
more people to expand the Hashemite kingdom, many Palestinians wished to return to their 
homes. Even though the Jordanian monarchy granted citizenship to hundreds of thousands of 
Palestinians, “this lack of a cohesive ethnic or religious base has given the Hashemites myriad of 
difficulties in shaping a national entity,”49 making it even more difficult to implement a 
utilitarian settlement policy. The East Bankers, those native to Jordan before its independence, 
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and the Palestinians clashed from the beginning of the 1948 refugee influx. King Hussein, a 
grandson of King Abdullah I, attempted to resolve the tension between East Bankers and West 
Bankers by “co-opting leaders of prominent families and tribes into his government.”50 Under 
King Hussein, Jordan held parliamentary elections in 1989; these were the first elections since 
the 1950s. Jordan held these elections in an attempt to begin political liberalization through free 
elections.51 This political integration aligns with Jacobsen’s model in that it indirectly made it 
easier for Palestinians to integrate into Jordanian society through easing the insecurities of their 
opponents.  
 By comparing the 1948 wave of Palestinian refugees to the Jacobsen model, it is clear 
that Jordan had positive responses to the refugee influx. The positive responses have led to 
largely positive outcomes for the refugees. There are millions of Palestinians in Jordan many of 
whom are direct descendants of the 1948 refugee influx. 52 The Jordanian government is one of 
the only governments to fully integrate Palestinians into its sociopolitical environment. The 
government did so with the 1948 refugee influx by permitting them citizenship and permanent 
residency, and these policies set the precedent for subsequent refugee waves that would confront 
Jordan in the future.  
1967 Palestinian Refugees 
 The main event that triggered the second major influx of refugees into Jordan was the Six 
Day War of 1967. This conflict led around 300,000 Palestinian refugees to surge into Jordan 
seeking asylum.53 The war lasted from June 5 to June 10, 1967, and the belligerents signed a 
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ceasefire on June 11, 1967. On one side was Israel and on the other were Egypt, Syria, Jordan, 
Iraq, and Lebanon. The Arab side of the conflict “talked of launching a people’s war of liberation 
to solve the Palestine problem,” which led to the Israeli attack on the West Bank village of Samu 
on November 13, 1966.54 This attack on Jordanian occupied territory subsequently led to a sharp 
division between Palestinians and the Jordanian government, for it “exposed the relative 
weakness of [Jordan’s] army…[and demonstrated its] inability to protect [the Palestinians], or 
provide them with the means to protect themselves.”55 The lack of trust between the Palestinians 
and the Jordanian government continued until the war broke out in 1967.  
 Ultimately, the Six Day War resulted in Jordan’s loss of the West Bank and East 
Jerusalem to Israeli control. On June 5th, the Jordanian military, along with forces from Egypt 
and Syria, foolishly attacked Israeli forces, and by June 8th, Israel had taken the West Bank. 
Following the events at Samu, this additional blow to Jordan’s military strength exacerbated the 
divide between Jordan and the Palestinians.56 Jordan lost 40 percent of its gross domestic product 
(GDP), 50 percent of its industrial capacity, and 25 percent of its arable land after it lost control 
of the West Bank.57 The Six Day War would be one of Jordan’s last attempts to “determine the 
trend for the region [and]...channel its efforts into trying to bring about the necessary 
circumstances to prevent war and to expedite diplomacy.”58 Domestic constraints and conflicts 
soon shadowed Jordan’s epiphany concerning its role in Middle Eastern relations. 
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Palestinians flooded by the tens of thousands into Jordan after Israel retook the West 
Bank. In general, other Arab states have “formally resisted resettlement or naturalization as a 
solution to the refugee problem,”59 distinguishing them from Jordan’s positive refugee policies. 
Following the 1967 war, Jordan allowed Palestinians across its borders once again. However, the 
refugees remained in camps—mainly the Jerash camp to the north of Amman.60 The 1967 wave 
did not receive residency rights from the Jordanian government, which demonstrates a key 
change in policy type—according to the Jacobsen model. Jordan did not grant the 1967 refugees 
citizenship like it did for the 1948 refugees because it was under the pretext that the Palestinians 
would return to Palestinian territories. They had the right to return, so the government avoided 
structural costs associated with providing citizenship to mass numbers of refugees.61  This policy 
change took an administrative hold when King Hussein “call[ed] for ‘administrative 
disengagement’ from the occupied territories in 1988.”62 Hussein’s negative policy included 
making Palestinian residents’ in the West Bank passports temporary rather than a proof of 
citizenship.63 This stricter regulation made it so Jordan considered Palestinians from the West 
Bank only to be travelers, and Jordan required the refugees to have visas to remain in the 
country. These new restrictions also affected the West Bankers who resided in Jordan already, 
for it revoked their access to work in the public sector, to social benefits, and government 
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services. 64 According to Jacobsen’s model, Hussein’s 1988 regulations reveals a shift from a 
positive to a negative policy type on Jordan’s part.  
The loss of the West Bank in 1967, as aforementioned, was a significant economic loss 
and a burden to Jordan. Jordan had “allocated about one-third of the Development Budget to the 
West Bank,” which the Israeli occupation of the West Bank squandered. This loss combined with 
the mass influx of refugees strained Jordan’s structural capacity to absorb negative costs. To deal 
with these costs on Jordan’s economy, the international community responded to the refugee 
crisis by providing foreign aid in the form of grants and other forms of financial aid.65 Saudi 
Arabia, Kuwait, and Libya pooled their funds and “provid[ed] an annual grant of 40 million 
pounds sterling ($112 million)”66 to Jordan in the wake of its massive economic losses. The 
United States gave aid to benefit refugees, and West Germany also gave to the refugees in 
addition to further assistance for Jordan’s development projects—amounting to $59 million.67 
Assistance from the international community compelled Jordan to continue its relatively positive 
refugee policies. When compared to Jacobsen’s model, it is clear that international influence 
played a significant role in Jordan’s decision-making and capacity to deal with the 1967 refugee 
influx. 
According to Jacobsen’s refugee commentary, “A community’s historical experience 
both with earlier refugee influxes and as refugees themselves is likely to influence its 
receptiveness.”68 This statement directly relates to Jordan’s developing status as a refugee state, 
as mass waves of refugees have consistently flowed into Jordan. Furthermore, it points out that 
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the community in the host country pressures the host government to make certain decisions. For 
example, the aforementioned issue of national identity for Palestinians continues to be a problem 
since the 1948 refugee influx. East Bank nationals support the idea of an independent Palestinian 
state and that Palestinians “should get Palestinian passports once there is a state, and should only 
receive Jordanian citizenship if they apply for it and are accepted.”69 This reluctance from 
Jordanian nationals to assimilate Palestinians constitutes an influential pressure on the Jordanian 
monarchy.   
Contemporary Palestinian-Jordanian Relations 
The relationship between the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) and the Jordanian 
government demonstrates the importance of Jacobsen’s other two sources of pressure—other 
than the international community. The Arab League created the PLO to encompass “all 
Palestinian organizations—commando groups, trade unions, professional associations, as well as 
national figures.”70 These parts of the PLO gather and collaborate to achieve Palestinians’ 
interests. Today, however, the PLO does not include Hamas of the Palestinian Islamic Jihad, 
which were meant to liberate Palestinian territories from Israel and to destroy the state of Israel, 
respectively. The Arab League established the PLO in 1964 to organize the Palestinian liberation 
cause across national borders, including Jordan, Lebanon, Syria, Kuwait, and others. The PLO’s 
overarching goal has evolved to embrace an autonomous Palestinian state through its own 
military, finance, politics, and administration.71 In the early 1970s, the Jordanian government and 
the PLO clashed, for Jordan “forbade PLO political, military and other mobilization activities 
within its territories.” This policy, that directly impacted refugees in Jordan, exemplifies the 
mixed policy types that Jordan implemented.  
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When the relationship between the Jordanian monarchy and the East Bankers wavers, the 
monarchy goes to great lengths to salvage and ease the relationship. The PLO has strained the 
relationship by widening the gap between the traditional Hashemites and the Palestinian 
condition. The civil war, known as Black September, began in September of 1970 and continued 
until July of 1971 between the PLO and the Jordanian monarchy. Several negative conditions led 
to the outbreak of the civil war, including inequitable job opportunities for Palestinians and 
misrepresented seats in parliament. Gerrymandered electoral districts, and discrimination toward 
Palestinians.72 The Jordanian government won the civil war, and most leading member of the 
PLO retreated to Lebanon.73 Despite the monarchy’s victory over the PLO in the 1980s and 
1990s, King Hussein “moved toward a limited democracy, balancing the interests of his ‘guest’ 
Palestinian constituents” and indigenous Jordanians.74 Hussein’s proposal of a limited 
democracy, a system where the king “expanded political limits but still controlled the [election] 
process,” was an attempt to subdue and prevent future uprisings and dissent from Palestinians.75  
As a result of the limited democracy, the Jordanian monarchy has the power to gloss over 
Palestinian representation in favor of the tribal candidates.76 Since the end of Black September, 
Palestinian popular protests and demonstrations have been small and infrequent. However, those 
known as the East Bankers, indigenous Jordanians, have protested against and blamed 
Palestinians for the rising cost of living and the spread of corruption. They expressed their 
                                                 
72 International Crisis Group, The Middle East: Dallying With Reform in a Divided Jordan, 
accessed April 22, 2016, http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/Middle%20 
East%20North%20Africa/Iran%20Gulf/Jordan/118-popular-protest -in-north-africa-and-the-middle-east-
ix-dallying-with-reform-in-a-divided-jordan.pdf. 
73 Colbert C. Held and John Thomas Cummings, Middle East Patterns: Places, Peoples, and 
Politics, 6th ed. (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 2014), 347. 
74 Ibid., 348.  
75 Ibid.  
76 Ellen Knickmeyer and Yasmin Mousa, “Jordan’s Limited Democracy Leaves Voters 
Discontented,” The Washington Post, November 20, 2007, accessed January 24, 2016, 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/11/19/AR2007111901497.html. 
  
24 
dissent on a day known as the Day of Anger in 2011.77 Other regional Arab Spring movement 
inspired thousands of Jordanians to gather all over the country to show their disdain of economic 
and political policies.78 It is a widely known fact that the Palestinians dominate the private, 
business sector of the Jordanian economy, and the indigenous Jordanians dominate the public 
sector.79 The ethnic divide within the Jordanian economy has caused political disparities between 
the often wealthier Palestinians and the indigenous Jordanians. The International Crisis Group 
described that several of the people’s grievances concerned government corruption among “a 
narrow business-state elite…[that] enrich[ed] itself through corrupt privatization deals,”80 
claiming government favoritism for the Palestinians involved in the private sector. In response to 
the Day of Anger protests, King Abdullah II, son of King Hussein, “slashed prices and taxes on 
some foods and fuels…to help ease the burden on the poor,” demonstrating that the king was 
engaged and constructively responsive to the demands of five thousand protestors.81  
Iraqi Refugees 
 Less than ten years passed from King Hussein’s formal renunciation of Jordan’s claims 
over the West Bank to yet another wave of refugees—this time from Iraq. There are two major 
Iraqi refugee influxes between the 1990s and the early 2000s; these influxes were the results of 
the Gulf War and the 2003 Iraq War, respectively. Jordan’s history as a state of asylum for 
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refugees shaped its policies toward future waves that it would face in the future. The 1990-1991 
Gulf War led “[one] million Iraqis and foreigners working in Iraq” to flee to Jordan in two 
months.82 The Gulf War started in August of 1990 as a result of the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. 
The Iraqi invasion led to incredible scrutiny from the international community, so much so that 
the United Nations imposed an embargo on Iraq.83 
 The UN trade embargo on Iraq is a significant demonstration on how the international 
community can have an influential impact on government decision-making. The embargo “had a 
particularly severe effect on Iraq’s economy and food security levels of the population,” causing 
about a million people to leave Iraq.  According to UNICEF (United Nations Children’s 
Emergency Fund), the per capita income in Iraq dropped from $3510 in 1989 to $450 in 1996.”84 
Not being able to import its regular food supply, Iraq introduced a food rationing system of 1,000 
per day per person; furthermore, the Iraqi population then became dependent on the food rations 
for survival.85 This massive reduction in per capita income and the heightened food insecurity 
served as catalysts to the Iraqi exodus to Jordan in the early 1990s.  
By 2002 the UNHCR estimated about 300,000 Iraqis in Jordan, which had a population 
of 5,000,000 at the time.86 This Iraqi migration qualifies, under Jacobsen’s criteria, as a refugee 
influx, for it occurred within two short months. The following section demonstrates that Jordan’s 
policies toward Iraqi refugees underwent an evolution—from initially unresponsive, to negative, 
to positive government responses.  
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 The border between Jordan and Iraq remained relatively porous, for “Jordanian 
authorities…barely acknowledged the presence and transit of this vast number of migrants.”87 
Jacobsen’s model would constitute this government reaction as nonresponsive. However, this 
seemingly unresponsive government reaction to the mass refugee influx proved to be a façade 
put on by the Jordanian government. The government instead pushed the “Jordanian public [and] 
foreign and national relief agencies…to [concentrate] their operations on the poorer sectors of 
the Jordanian population.”88 The monarchy pushed third parties to focus aid and resources on 
other groups other than the Iraqi refugees, diverting attention away from the crisis. Jordan made 
these negative policy decisions to attempt to channel the effects of international pressure on its 
actions. These negative policy decisions included funneling international aid to different sectors 
of the Jordanian population other than the new refugee population and failing to recognize Iraqis 
as refugees but guests instead. However, it allowed refugees to cross its borders and inhabit its 
territories regardless. Under Jacobsen’s model, the fact that the Jordanian government continued 
to permit the refugees to come in to the country reinforces the idea that its policy types toward 
refugees remained relatively positive. Jordan’s government response to Iraqi refugees went 
through an evolution—from non-responsive to negative, to positive. The negative response was a 
reaction to Jordan’s threatened resources and structural capacity to cope. It was not, however, a 
sustained policy response because Jordan eventually engaged in negotiations with international 
organizations, like the UN, to attain additional resources. The complete evolution of Jordan’s 
response to both Iraqi refugee crises does not define Jordan’s positive response type until the end 
of the 2003 Iraqi refugee influx has run its course—around 2009.  
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The effects of the 1990 Gulf War refugee crisis in Jordan rolled over into the next Iraqi 
refugee crisis that came with the United States’ invasion of Iraq in 2003. The 2003 refugee influx 
strained Jordan’s economic and social capacity even further than the 1990 influx. The United 
States’ policies toward its invasion of Iraq were meant to restructure Iraqi systems and society, 
“creating the Iraq that this policy…imagined.”89 For instance, US forces preserved and protected 
those Iraqi institutions and systems that would serve US interests “while allowing facilities 
critical to either Iraqi state functionality or national cohesion to be looted down to the office 
furniture.”90 This ‘imagined community’ led to the collapse of Iraqi institutions and social 
cohesion by putting sectarian and foreign policy objectives before a functioning state.91  
The state that the United States tried to create eliminated the Iraqi people’s sense of 
security and safety, causing them to leave Iraq en masse. The 2003 war in Iraq caused as many as 
2.2 million people to exit Iraq—most of them seeking refuge in Syria and Jordan.92 Of those, 
between 450,000 and 750,000 Iraqis came to Jordan. There has been significant debate between 
the Jordanian government and international organizations, like the UN, as to the exact numbers 
of refugees that came to Jordan after 2003. Nonetheless, this mass migration of Iraqis into Jordan 
qualifies as a mass refugee influx under Jacobsen’s model. As discussed previously, according to 
Géraldine Chatelard, there are two motivations that drive the Jordanian government’s perception 
of the refugees’ presence: 
…a vision of their [the refugees’] role as predators on the scarce natural and 
economic resources of Jordan and a primary force in driving up prices of goods 
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and properties legitimizes claims to international assistance to ‘relieve’ the burden 
on Jordan.93 
 
Host governments often confront this type of dilemma—to exaggerate the numbers to get 
more aid or to protect resources. In these types of situations, pressure comes from both 
the host government to international organizations and from the Jordanian people to the 
government, calling for solutions to resource shortages, or Jacobsen’s structural capacity. 
 The Jordanian government’s history of attempting to appease and include both the 
Palestinians and the East Bankers has demonstrated its dedication to minimizing the 
negative effects of mass migration. While King Hussein took an interest in Palestinian 
refugees as political and territorial assets, the refugee crisis that transpires as a result of 
the US invasion of Iraq led the monarchy to view refugees as a “security or economic 
issue rather than a humanitarian one.”94 The government became more concerned with its 
ability to absorb hundreds of thousands of new residents. This shift in the perception of 
refugees is further explored in subsequent sections with statements from the Jordanian 
Minister of Interior.  
 International aid, like the United States Agency for International Development’s 
(USAID) school program, began to seek cooperation from the Jordanian government to 
supplement Jordan’s already sparse resources.95 The monarchy dealt with and received the Iraqi 
refugees with an attitude of tolerance rather than one of acceptance like with the Palestinians in 
the 20th century. In the early 2000s, the Jordanian government considered the refugees “guests,” 
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denoting the temporary nature of their stay in Jordan.96 Despite their status as “guests” in Jordan, 
the Iraqi refugees garnered much international attention and international aid. This international 
aid came in the form of direct monetary donations and assistance from nongovernmental 
organizations (NGO). Some scholars, like Jeff Crisp of the University of Oxford Refugee Studies 
Centre, assert that there is a politics to the numerical estimates of refugees that host countries 
posit. Crisp states that host governments inflate the number of refugees in their countries to 
 …embarrass the government of the country of asylum and to  besmirch its human 
rights record; to attract large amounts of humanitarian assistance into the country, 
which can then be siphoned off to members of the political, military and business 
elite; to provide employment to large numbers of bureaucrats and refugee camp 
workers, many of whom would otherwise be without work or an income; to 
ensure a generous supply of food and other relief items to exiled groups which are 
engaged in political and military campaigns against their country of origin; to 
maximize the amount of foreign exchange brought into the country by 
humanitarian agencies, which can subsequently be converted at rates favourable 
to the government; and to cast the most favourable light possible on the country’s 
commitment to humanitarian norms, thereby bolstering its international reputation 
and external support.97 
 
Jordan received intense international attention for the Iraqi refugee crisis of 2003 and 
onward, but some accused its government of “hijack[ing] the aid and redirect[ing] it 
toward favored national programs.”98 Jordan acted within the bounds of tolerance, using 
international assistance to its benefit.  
In 2007, the Jordanian Minister of Interior, Id al-Fayiz, made this distinction of 
Iraqis seeking asylum in Jordan, “refus[ing] to label Iraqis in Jordan as refugees, but 
rather brethren and guests in the kingdom with full respect until their ordeal ends…[and 
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they are] allow[ed] to go back to their country.”99 Al-Fayiz’s statement is a representation 
and demonstration of Jordan’s sometimes mixed policy types toward refugees. Jordan 
permitted refugees to cross its borders and to somewhat assimilate into its community; 
however, it stressed the economic strain that the Iraqis put on Jordan, thus fortifying its 
reluctance to recognize them officially as refugees. By granting official refugee status to 
Iraqis, Jordan would be responsible for providing certain services under UNHCR 
regulations. The 1951 Refugee Convention officially defined who qualified as a refugee 
and what their respective rights were as such. Article thirty-three in the 1951 convention 
details the principle of refoulement. The refoulement principle prohibits host countries 
from refugee expulsion from or forcible return to the origin country if their lives or 
freedom “would be threatened on account of his race, religion, nationality, membership 
of a particular group or political opinion.”100 This is the type of issue that the convention 
addresses, but Jordan was not a signatory at the time of the post-2003 refugee influx and 
is not one as of 2016. If Jordan was a signatory, then the provisions therein per 
international law would bind it to these types of responsibilities. Despite the fact that 
Jordan is not a member of the 1951 UN convention concerning refugees, its policy types 
remained within Jacobsen’s positive policy classification by allowing refugees to cross its 
borders, tolerating mild assimilation, and cooperating with international refugee 
organizations during the Iraqi refugee influxes. 
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Syrian Refugees: 2011 to the Present 
 The current refugee crisis is largely a result of the Syrian Civil War, which started in 
2011. Millions of Syrians displaced Syrians have fled their homes to escape the brutal conflict 
between rebels and President Bashar al-Assad’s government. As of February 2015, over 622,000 
Syrians have registered as refugees in Jordan.101 In 2015 Jordan’s population was 8.1 million 
according to the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) World Factbook. The CIA inflated the size 
of the Jordanian population to include the increased flow of Syrian refugees into Jordan.102  
The Syrian Civil War began during the Arab Spring when the Syrian people held several 
popular uprisings that turned violent in March of 2011. Between March and December 2011, the 
UN high commissioner for human rights “estimated that more than 4,000 people, including 307 
children have been killed…since the uprising erupted against the government of President 
Bashar al-Assad,”103 and the government has detained about 14,000 people.104 The original 
protests demanded that al-Assad’s government embrace democratic political reforms, shadowing 
the protests in Egypt and Tunisia. In March 2011 the Arab Spring seemed like a promising 
platform from which comprehensive political reform could arise. However, the Syrian 
government “started firing live ammunition at crowds… [and] arresting and torturing 
protestors,”105 
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In addition, Jordan has constructed several Syrian refugee camps, such as Zaatari in 
Amman. King Abdullah II has worked closely with international organizations, like UNHCR, to 
manage the huge refugee influxes it receives every day.  Jordan has established naturalization 
processes for Palestinians, refugee camps for Syrians, and several other mechanisms for 
managing refugee crises. These actions have demonstrated Jordan’s relatively hospitable nature 
towards refugee populations. However, Jordan’s resources, already environmentally and 
economically limited, have become even more strained after generations of refugee crises.  
 In line with Jacobsen’s three sources of pressure (international, local, and refugee), King 
Abdullah II has expressed the strain that Syrian refugees have had on Jordan’s services, 
infrastructure, and economy. Before a donor conference on the Syrian conflict in February 2016, 
Abdullah II stated, “it’s [the refugee crisis] gotten to a boiling point… [and] sooner or later…the 
dam is going to burst.”106 He called on the international community to offer additional assistance 
if Jordan was to continue to accept Syrian refugees. The Jordanian government cannot hope to 
assimilate Syrians into the job market without providing similar opportunities to Jordanians. 
Providing all working-age Syrians with work permits could take jobs away from Jordanians, 
which could lead to popular unrest and potential violent demonstrations. To solve this dilemma, 
Abdullah II promised Jordanians “For every job the government offered Syrian refugees, it 
would create five jobs for Jordanians.”107 In this scenario, it is pressure from Jordan’s local 
community, as a result of structural limitations, that is putting the most pressure on government 
decisions. At the conference, the UN stated that it sought $7.7 billion to “fund aid operations for 
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February 13, 2016, accessed April 22, 2016, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2016/02/14/world/middleeast/jordan-syria-refugees.html. 
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22.5 million people in Syria and neighbouring countries next year.”108 The king has asked for 
international assistance to handle the crisis, aligning with Jacobsen’s model having to do with 
international components. Donors pledged to give “$2.1 billion to Jordan over the next three 
years;”109 however, Jordan stated that the aid would come with certain stipulations, like jobs for 
200,000 Syrians. Because the monarchy has reached out to the international community,110 
namely the hosts of the conference (United Kingdom, Germany, Norway, Kuwait, and the UN), 
it further demonstrates its positive policy type and willingness to find solutions to the current 
crisis.  
Jordanian Case and Jacobsen’s Model 
Making comprehensive, equitable, and efficient refugee policy is incredibly difficult 
because the government must take into consideration economic, political, social, and 
humanitarian issues simultaneously. Refugee absorption demands that the host country be able to 
structurally, fiscally, and socially accept mass numbers of people. Irrefutably, Jordan has 
confronted these types of issues—as aforementioned, housing shortages and social unrest. King 
Hussein’s restrictions on Palestinian passports in the late 1980s and King Abdullah II’s policies 
that diverted the international community’s attention away from the Iraqi refugee crisis were 
examples of negative policy types according to Jacobsen’s model. However, these negative 
policies were almost a direct reaction to Jordan’s own sparse resources. King Hussein’s passport 
regulations after his 1988 renunciation of claims over the West Bank were a response Jordan’s 
inability to permanently accept Palestinians. He made these regulations with the expectation that 
Palestinians would eventually return to the West Bank. By diverting the international 
                                                 
108 Ibid.  
109 Ibid. 
110 The international community is also attempting to deal with the Syrian refugee crisis, which 
has spread to European countries. See Appendix B for a map detailing the number of Syrians in 
neighboring countries and Europe.  
  
34 
community’s attention away from the Iraqi refugee crisis, the Jordanian government was able to 
funnel international aid to the poorer members of the Jordanian population. These negative, 
according to Jacobsen, policy types were not because Jordan did not have the desire or will to 
tolerate and accept refugees; they were because the refugees threatened to overwhelm Jordan’s 
stability and capacity to absorb large numbers of people.  
Jordan’s positive policy decisions are its attempts to manage these capacity issues it faced 
with the Iraqis and Palestinians and continues to face with the Syrian refugees.111 These positive 
policies are demonstrations of Jordan’s consistent, accepting, and solution-driven mindset when 
dealing with refugees. Though the Jordanian monarchy exhibited some remnants of negative 
policy types, according to Jacobsen’s model, its ultimate policy type is positive. Jordan’s laws 
and cooperation with international organizations clearly demonstrate its dedication to easing 
refugee relations as much as it is able according to its economic, political, and social capacity.  
 
                                                 
111 Note the element in Jacobsen’s model that refers to the structural ability of the host country to 
absorb and deal with mass refugee influxes. A host country’s structural ability is determined by economic 
capacity, international assistance, and the local community’s willingness to accommodate refugees.  
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Conclusion 
The model of host government decision making outlined in Karen Jacobsen’s paper, 
“Factors Influencing the Policy Responses of Host Governments to Mass Refugee Influxes,” is a 
concise, all-inclusive set of guidelines that help evaluate Jordan’s approach to refugee influxes. 
Her model is not overly complex, for it only identifies three policy types that host governments 
usually adopt—positive, negative, or non-reactant. However, it breaks down those three policy 
types into three additional categories that are easily defined and recognized. As discussed in the 
theory section of this paper, these three subcategories are legal-bureaucratic responses, 
involvement of international refugee organizations, and the admission and treatment of 
refugees.112  Overwhelmingly, Jordan has chosen and implemented refugee policy that aligns 
with Jacobsen’s positive policy types. Jordan’s constitution outlines procedures for refugee 
assimilation, admits asylum seekers, cooperates with the UNHCR to facilitate repatriation, and 
attempts to establish the potential for local settlement or permanent residence. Ultimately, Jordan 
has undergone an evolution, involving some trial and error, to an overwhelmingly positive policy 
response to mass refugee influxes. This may be a fascinating topic for further research—whether 
Jordan became path dependent upon its decisions it made with the 1948 Palestinian refugee 
wave. The positive policies that Jordan implemented, like granting Palestinians Jordanian 
citizenship, were practical and territorially strategic at the time but persisted through subsequent 
refugee influxes. This path dependence might explain why Jordan has continued to pursue a 
positive policy type throughout its history of refugee influxes.  
 Because Jacobsen’s model is clean cut and intelligible, one is able to recognize and 
define Jordan’s general positive policy attitude. Her model will aid the international community 
as a whole in distinguishing and identifying governments’, not just Jordan’s, refugee policy 
                                                 
112 See Appendix A for the full chart of Jacobsen’s possible state responses. 
  
36 
decision making. Jacobsen points out “changes taking place in both the local community and the 
international arena will affect policymaking, as do the shifting linkages between the government, 
the local community, and the international organizations.”113 This statement successfully 
highlights the main benefit that her model provides—to help both the international community 
and host governments cope with the growing refugee burden.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
113 Jacobsen, 674. 
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Appendix A 
Jacobsen Model Outline 
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Syrians in Neighboring Countries and Europe 
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